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27 September 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Personnel Recommendations for
National Intelligence Officers

1. Desiderata. Selecting National Intelligence Officers is a complex business governed by at least four sets of criteria:

(1) The putative NIO must have a personal substantive grasp of his field sufficient to command the respect of others (at all levels) working in it and the respect of policy-level consumers who direct to him their questions about it. He should also know where the talent in various aspects of his field lies and/or works -- within the Agency, the community, non-intelligence components of the government, academia, the press, etc.

(2) The putative NIO should have enough politico-bureaucratic knowledge/flair/drive/acumen/skill to be an effective manager without ever forgetting that he is (a) a staff officer and (b) the DCI's staff officer. He will have to be able to energize disparate elements of the Agency, community, and government, to induce them to work together in productive harmony without counterproductively disrupting command lines or bruising bureaucratic egos in the process.

(3) Though arbitrary quotas should be eschewed, the total mix of NIOs -- plus their assistants -- should nonetheless represent a reasonable balance of people from various Agency and community components with some outside salting.

(4) The combinatory chemistry has to be right so the total mix of NIOs and assistants can function as a symbiotic, synergistic whole greater than the sum of its component parts.

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2. The key to the success or failure of the NIO concept is the caliber of the people picked to implement it -- especially those selected the first time around to be the initial NIOs and assistants.

3. Initial Recommendations. Per our previous conversations, outlined below are firm recommendations for six of the initial twelve NIO positions, tentative recommendations on two and some comments on the remaining four.

25X1 (1) The USSR and East European Satellites: I think we are both agreed that [] is the optimum choice for this billet -- if or when we can get him -- with [] as first alternate.

25X1 One of us (your option) should try to get a firm reading on when [] could become available. If it is not until after 1 February 1974, I recommend

25X1 [] be named and that he be named as the NIO (with a title unbecombed by "acting"), but that he be privately told that his is a short term appointment. If you can give a reasonably firm commitment on a suitably attractive subsequent appointment when you first talk with him, I think this would work. If [] could be available before 1 January, certainly before 1 December (miracles do occasionally happen), I think the post should be held open until he fills it. Since things in this arena are more likely to be imprecise and untidy, we may have to play by ear.

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(2) Soviet Operations: David Murphy (whom you have already chosen).

25X1 (3) China: Here is a place for an academic and an area in which the intelligence community could use some fresh thinking. As we have discussed, [] would seem to be a good choice by virtue of his background, temperament and present position. Be forewarned that the specialized purists may sniff at his credentials as a "China scholar," thinking of him primarily as a Southeast Asian. (The Southeast Asians, incidentally, tend to think of him as a moonlighting -- or poaching -- Chinaman.) My acquaintance with him over the years has been casual, but he does strike me as having drive and bureaucratic flair and of course he has recently visited the PRC. How receptive he might be to an offer, I cannot say. The best way to find out would probably be for me to hop on a plane to Boston and ask him, or (if you want to be slightly more formal) invite him to come to Washington for a day or

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two (at our expense). We would probably have to offer him a GS-18. If the conversations progressed favorably, we should be prepared for questions on whether the government would defray moving expenses. As you know, [] an Agency (ONE) consultant, hence he already has some form of clearance. If you want to try this idea, however, Howard Osborn should probably be asked to ascertain quietly (if he can, under current ground rules) whether there is any perceivable problem that could seriously complicate giving him the clearances he would need as an NIO. Any offer we make would, of course, have to be contingent on a clearance -- and [] would accept this readily (I think) -- but, where possible, awkward situations should be avoided.

(4) Southeast Asia: This assignment we have also discussed. I am assuming here that the [] complication has been resolved. As indicated in our conversation, I strongly recommend []. He can unquestionably do the job, since for several months he has largely done it -- and done it very well. Do not be deceived by his deceptively mild manner, low-key approach or aversion to self-advertisement. Bill has the professional respect -- and personal regard -- of his Indochina colleagues throughout the Agency and the community.

(5) The Middle East and Islamic World: For a variety of reasons which we have already discussed, []

(6) Energy. Again, as we have discussed, the best candidate is Jim Critchfield. There is no better whose name immediately suggests itself. Jim is already doing his thing (very well, so far as I know) and if anyone else were chosen, he and Jim would immediately butt heads. Furthermore, choosing Jim would give us a senior DDO career officer on the panel.

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4. Holding Patterns. There are two present members of the Board of National Estimates -- [redacted] -- who are natural candidates for two NIO billets, namely (and respectively) Western Europe and Latin America. Both of these billets, however, are ones for which a suitable State Department candidate might be found -- e.g., [redacted] an an FSO-2, [redacted]

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5. The Pending Quartet: On the remaining four slots, I am simply not yet ready to make firm recommendations:

(1) Japan and the Pacific: This is another possibility for an academic or a State Department officer. [redacted]

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(2) Strategic Weapons, etc. and (3) Conventional Armed Forces, etc: Before making recommendations on either of these two, I need to talk with Duckett, Proctor, Knoche, Secretary Schlesinger, and Admiral de Poix. If at all possible, we ought to try to fill one of these two posts with an active duty military officer, if one can be found who meets all the major desiderata. Let me come back to you on these.

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(4) Economics: This is another billet for which more information and reflection should precede any final selection. It too could perhaps be filled by an outsider, such as [redacted] highly endorses). It is also a billet for which [redacted] of the Board of National Estimates should not be ruled out. Let me talk with Schlesinger and again with [redacted] -- and to Proctor -- before coming back with any positive recommendations.

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6. Appended for your information is a consolidated set of nomination inputs pulled together by my secretary. You might find it helpful. (The inputs, of course, do not include Soviet Operations, for which you have already chosen [redacted] and they combine what we now envisage as two billets: China and Japan plus Pacific Asia.)

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7. A final note, I have not yet decided precisely how large an editorial staff we will need but agree with Proctor that [redacted] should definitely be part of it.

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[redacted]
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachments

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Approved For Release 2003/09/29 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001300030012-1

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